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Abstract
One obstacle faced by proposals of retrocausal influences in quantum mechanics
is the perceived high conceptual cost of making such a proposal. I assemble here a
metaphysical picture consistent with the possibility of retrocausality and not pre-
cluded by the known physical structure of our reality. I conclude that given the
right mix of some reasonable metaphysical and epistemological ingredients there is
no conceptual cost to such a picture.
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1 Introduction
It is no secret that by permitting retrocausal influences in quantum mechanics local hid-
den variables can be used to account for the violation of Bell’s Inequality.1 But can we
rest easy knowing that such a retrocausal picture is metaphysically tenable? The meta-
physics of retrocausality is often broached in the philosophical literature in and around
discussions of time travel and causal paradoxes and there seems to be a general sentiment
that there is nothing manifestly self-contradictory about the idea, strange though it may
seem at first. There is, however, a significant challenge from the philosophy of physics
literature: Maudlin (2002) claims that retrocausality is fundamentally at odds with the
“metaphysical picture of the past generating the future” and thus cannot be entertained
as a metaphysical possibility in a reality such as ours. The plausibility of Maudlin’s
metaphysical picture will not be of concern to us here.2 The purpose of this paper is
to counterbalance Maudlin’s picture with a carefully considered metaphysical alternative
that coheres with the possibility of retrocausality and that is not precluded by the known
physical structure of our reality.
1See, for instance, Argaman (2008), Costa de Beauregard (1953; 1976; 1977), Cramer (1980; 1986),
Hokkyo (1988), Miller (1996; 1997), Price (1984; 1994; 1996; 1997; 2001; 2008; 2010), Rietdijk (1978),
Sutherland (1983; 1998; 2008) and Wharton (2007; 2010).
2Though see Evans, Price and Wharton (2010) for some discussion of this point.
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This project does not introduce any explicitly new metaphysical ideas; on the contrary,
the picture developed here is a conglomeration of developed material from various contexts
that is merely collected together under the one roof. I begin by setting out in Section 2
two relatively uncontroversial positions that will serve as a solid conceptual foundation
upon which to develop our metaphysical picture: the block universe model of time in
Section 2.1 and the interventionist account of causation in Section 2.2. There are then
two metaphysical intuitions that must be dismantled. The first is our ordinary asymmetric
causal intuition: in Section 3.1 I describe an argument from temporal symmetry against
the plausibility of extending our asymmetric causal intuitions to the microscopic realm.
The second is our ordinary intuition about epistemic access to the past: in Section 3.2
I present an argument that clears a logical space for retrocausation at the expense of
our intuition that our past is necessarily epistemically accessible independent of our own
future actions. This then clears the way to build a symmetric picture of causation:
Section 4 sets forth a model of agent deliberation that reconciles our notion of free will
and unidirectional causation with a deterministic and causally symmetric metaphysical
picture.
It is often claimed that the introduction of retrocausal influences into the interpretation
of quantum theory is a higher conceptual cost to pay than the problems associated with
the rejection of local hidden variables. The metaphysical picture assembled here is an
attempt to show that there is no conceptual cost at all associated with retrocausality.
2 Foundations
2.1 The block universe model of time
We begin building our metaphysical picture with a temporal model popular among many
physicists and philosophers: the block universe model of time. Rather than modelling re-
ality as a three dimensional space evolving under the passage of time, reality is envisaged
according to this view as a four dimensional block of which time is a mere passive ingredi-
ent. In the philosophical literature the block universe view is thought of as characterised
by two claims: the past, present and future are equally real; and there is no privileged
instant nor objective flow of time through the block. The spatial and temporal relations
between all events in the four dimensional block are thus on an equal footing and exist
atemporally. This view thus forges a strong analogy between the conception of time and
our ordinary conception of space. Just as there is nothing objective about labelling a
particular position in space ‘here’ nor claiming the contents of ‘here’ to be more real than
the contents of ‘there’, there is nothing objective about labelling a particular time ‘now’
whose contents can be thought of as any more real than the contents of any other position
within the block.
The block universe model of time is consistent with a deterministic model of reality. In
a deterministic physical model, specifying data along a single hypersurface of spacetime
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is sufficient to determine the events of spacetime past and future of the hypersurface.
Similarly, the block universe view is committed to the reality of all the events of four
dimensional spacetime.
2.2 The interventionist account of causation
The interventionist account of causation is introduced and defended in Woodward (2003).
According to this account, we say that C is a cause of E just in case there is some possible
intervention that can be carried out on C that will change E in some way or other,
holding fixed all other properties of the system containing C and E. Woodward’s account
is explicitly counterfactual in the sense that there need be only some possible intervention
that can be made on C to bring about a change in E. The advantage of this account
is that it can be utilised in providing causal explanations without requiring that there
exist a complete description of some spatiotemporal process connecting C and E. Let us
consider an illustrative example.
Imagine the ignition system of a car. It seems that we would want to say that the
turning of the key in the ignition (event K) is the cause of the starting of the car’s engine
(event E). According to the interventionist account we can say that K is indeed the cause
of E since it is possible to carry out an intervention on K, by not turning the key say,
that will change E in some way or other, in this case the engine would simply not start,
provided all the other elements contributing to the system were held fixed. We can in fact
claim a causal connection here without explicitly spelling out the mechanism by which
the turning of the key brought about the starting of the engine. However, this does not
mean that we cannot spell out such a mechanism if we wished.
Consider the mechanical chain of events connecting the turning of the key to the
starting of the engine: turning the key (event K) completes the circuit between the car’s
battery and the starter motor (event C) which then starts the starter motor spinning
(event S); the spinning starter motor then turns over the drive shaft of the engine (event
D) which starts the pistons drawing in and then combusting the fuel (event P); the
combusting fuel powers the engine to start running (event E). We have a chain of events,
K → C → S → D → P → E, with a mechanical account of how each event
brings about the next. However, the content of any causal claim about any two of these
events according to the interventionist account of causation is not that there exists a
mechanical connection between the events. The key to the interventionist account is to
imagine that each of these events is a handle or variable that can be manipulated and
controlled. Accordingly, what makes each event the cause of the next is the fact that there
exists a functional dependency between the variables; that is, some possible intervention
on a particular variable will (over a range of conditions) bring about a consistent change
in the values of the variables further down the chain. If we were to intervene on the above
system by replacing the battery with an old or faulty battery, the starter motor would fail
to spin, thus changing the value of the variable associated with event S (on or off, say)
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from what it would have been had we not made the intervention.
The chain of events may be more complex than the example above; events might
have multiple causes or multiple effects. We can extend our example by imagining that
event K, the turning of the key, also completes the circuit between the car battery and
the dashboard, lighting up all the instruments inside the cabin (event I). We could also
imagine that in order for the drive shaft to turn over (event D), the car’s gearbox must
be disengaged (event G). We can establish which correlations are causal by imagining
possible interventions of these new variables while holding the rest of our variables fixed.
If we sever the connection between the car battery and the dashboard, the battery would
still connect to the starter motor bringing about the ignition of the car’s engine. Thus,
the dashboard lighting up is not a cause of the car’s engine starting, even though these
events are very often correlated. However, if we engage the gearbox with the drive shaft
and attempt to start the car, we find that the car stalls. Whether the gearbox is engaged
or not, i.e. whether the variable associated with event G is one value or another, has a
functional relationship to whether the car starts or not and is thus a cause of event E.
There is one further issue which arises from this account of causation that will be cru-
cial to our characterisation of retrocausality later in this chapter. It will be beneficial for
our purposes here to view the interventionist account of causation as a kind of genealogi-
cal account of how we, as agents, come to acquire the concept of causation in relation to
the world around us. To begin demonstrating how this might be the case, consider the
way we might use causal concepts to describe a situation in which it is impossible for us
as humans to intervene on the system. The gravitational pull of the moon is responsible
for the tides of the ocean, and we would want to say that the moon causes the tides to
come in and out as they do. Even though it is impossible for us to actually manipulate
and control this system, we can attribute our causal intuitions in this sort of case to an
ability to extend our causal intuitions from cases in which we can manipulate and control.
Through our knowledge of the gravitational interaction between the moon and the tides,
we can predict with confidence what the effect of some imagined (but perhaps physically
impossible) intervention would be if we could in fact bring it about. It is this sort of
knowledge which we usually gain by physical intervention and experimentation that al-
lows us to make claims about the causal relations that exist within a system. Thus, it
seems reasonable that we extend these causal notions to cases in which we do not in fact
have the requisite ability to manipulate and control.
I mention this feature of the interventionist account here to highlight the fact that
a consequence of this view is that our role as agents in the world can be seen as at the
root of our concept of causation. We will take this idea up again below where we will
be in a position to expand on it in more depth. For now I simply wish tentatively to
broach the outcome of this genealogical sketch that a being which interacted with the
world differently to us as agents would have a very different concept of causation to the
one that we have.
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With these metaphysical foundations in mind, let us now move on to dismantling two
of our ordinary temporal intuitions.
3 Dismantling intuitions
3.1 Macroscopic intuitions, microscopic symmetry
A familiar intuition, indeed one that seems almost trivial, is that the properties of inter-
acting systems are independent before they interact. This is built upon the observation
of many instances where this apparent principle holds true. In macroscopic systems we
take this principle for granted. However, Price (1996; 1997) ask the question whether
we are justified in extrapolating this familiar macroscopic principle to considerations of
microscopic systems. Let us consider Price’s analysis.
Firstly, it seems that the origin of this principle is related to the asymmetry of thermo-
dynamics. When systems evolve from states of disequilibrium (lower entropy) to states
of equilibrium (higher entropy) it is because the initial conditions are special; namely,
the initial conditions are low entropy. Thus, if we were to consider a macroscopic system
evolving in the reverse temporal direction, it would look strange because it would appear
that highly correlated incoming influences were converging from disparate regions of space
(imagine a pile of rubble ‘un-collapsing’ into a building) and these would be associated
with a decrease in entropy. In such a case the violation of the principle that physical
processes are uncorrelated before they interact would be a direct product of the violation
of the second law of thermodynamics. Looking forwards in time again we can see that
the temporal asymmetry which manifests itself in the correlations between outgoing influ-
ences is a result of special (low entropy) initial conditions and not a result of an inherent
asymmetry within the laws of physics.
It appears to be assumed that this principle of outgoing correlations but incoming
independence holds in the microscopic case just like in the macroscopic case. However,
explaining this temporal asymmetry of microscopic systems in terms of boundary con-
ditions simply does not work. The boundary conditions explanation is based upon the
temporal asymmetry of entropy change. In a microscopic system, such as that of two
particles which come together, interact and then separate, there is no entropy change to
indicate a temporal orientation to the interaction. The temporal reverse of the interaction
would look much the same as in the ordinary temporal direction; this is a function of the
temporal symmetry of the dynamical laws of the system. Thus, there seems to be no
reason to assume that outgoing correlations exist in one direction and not in the other.
Furthermore, unlike in the macroscopic case, there is no observed asymmetry in micro-
scopic systems that needs to be explained. We simply do not observe the independence of
incoming particles nor the correlation of outgoing particles, yet we still assume that this
principle holds for microscopic systems despite its incompatibility with the temporally
symmetric nature of the dynamical laws of physical systems.
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Therefore we are left with a dichotomy between two physical principles at the micro-
scopic level: temporal symmetry in the dynamical laws of physical systems on the one
hand and, on the other hand, the asymmetry of the independence of microscopic systems
prior to interacting with each other. As such, one could make quite a persuasive argument
against the independence of microscopic systems prior to interaction purely on symmetry
grounds. Moreover, with no existing observational evidence in favour of the independence
of incoming particles or the correlation of outgoing particles, it seems that such a principe
may not deserve the status it currently enjoys in considerations of microscopic systems. If
this principle is then abandoned, one is led to the conclusion that temporally symmetric
causation in microscopic systems cannot be ruled out on analytic grounds. Thus if we take
these considerations seriously then the physical structure of our reality does not preclude
a metaphysical picture allowing such retrocausal influences.
3.2 The bilking argument
In our normal conception of causation, causes precede their effects. A causally symmetric
viewpoint opens up the possibility that effects can precede their causes. This, however,
immediately creates some conceptual difficulties. To demonstrate these difficulties, let us
imagine a pair of events which we believe to be causally connected: a cause, C, and an
effect, E. Let us further imagine that this connection is retrocausal; E occurs earlier in
time than C. On first appearances it would then seem possible to devise an experiment
which could confirm whether our belief in the causal connection is correct or not. Namely,
once we had observed that E had occurred, we could then set about ensuring that C does
not occur, thereby breaking any retrocausal connection that could have existed between
them. If we were successful in doing this, then we would have bilked the effect of its cause.
This is the bilking argument.
The bilking argument seems to drive one towards the claim that any belief an agent
might hold in the positive correlation between event C and event E is simply false. If this
were the case then the agent would have to give up any belief in retrocausal influences
between C and E. Dummett (1964) disputes that giving up this belief is the only solution
to the bilking argument. In exploring the terms under which a belief in retrocausation
can be maintained, Dummett suggests that what the bilking argument actually shows is
that a set of three conditions concerning the two events, and the agent’s relationship to
them, is incoherent. In any incoherent set of conditions, all three conditions cannot hold
simultaneously. Thus, depending on which of these three conditions fails to hold, there
may be scope for an agent to maintain a belief that the later cause retrocausally influences
the earlier event. To motivate these conditions, let us consider Dummett’s own example.
Dummett imagines a tribe to exist with the custom of sending young men on a lion
hunt to prove their bravery. The men travel for two days, hunt for two days and spend
two days on their return journey. Observers travel with the young men and report back to
the chief of the tribe whether the men acquitted themselves with bravery or not. While
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the young men are away, the chief performs dances intended to cause the young men
to act bravely. Significantly, he performs these dances for the whole six days, i.e. for
two days during which the events that the dancing is supposed to influence have already
taken place. The chief notices that on occasions when he dances, he subsequently learns
that the young men had hunted bravely and, on occasions when he does not dance, he
subsequently learns that the young men had hunted in a cowardly fashion. The chief
thus observes there to be a positive correlation between his dancing and the young men’s
bravery and therefore maintains a belief in retrocausation.
Imagine further that we are to convince the chief that this practice of his were absurd.
We arrange that the observers who had accompanied the hunt return early and report
to the chief whether or not the young men had acted bravely. We then set a bilking
challenge to the chief to dance if and only if the young men had not acted bravely.
There are two possible outcomes of this challenge. If the chief accepts this challenge and
dances then he must concede that his dancing does not ensure the bravery of the young
men. Alternatively, imagine that the chief accepts the challenge and then discovers he is
inexplicably unable to dance, i.e. his limbs will simply not move. Then the chief would
have to admit that dancing is not an action which is within his power to perform. If this
were to occur, however, it would then be fair to say that it is not the chief’s dancing
that causes the young men to be brave, rather it is the young men’s bravery that makes
possible his dancing. Thus, regardless of whether the chief dances or not, it seems that
the chief must give up his belief in retrocausation.
It appears then that there are two incompatible conditions here concerning the chief’s
dancing: (i) there is a positive correlation between the chiefs dancing and the bravery
of the young men; and (ii) dancing is within the power of the chief to perform. If the
first condition is to hold, then the second condition must fail, and vice versa, as we have
just seen. Dummett, however, suggests that an implicit third condition can be violated
which allows both of these conditions to hold simultaneously and thus allows the chief
to maintain his belief in retrocausation. To see this, let us first consider an agent who
believes a certain action is effective in bringing about a subsequent event. Such an agent
would believe the action to be the cause of the later effect. Dummett recognises that there
is a connection between the foreknowledge the agent possesses about the subsequent event
and the intention the agent has to perform the action. The agent knows an event occurs
in the future because they intend to bring it about by performing a certain action: the
agent possesses knowledge in intention. This is in contrast to knowledge of the past which
we can possess in more forms than merely in intention.
Let us then return to our example and imagine for the sake of argument that there
is a parallel between the knowledge that the chief can possess concerning the bravery of
the young men and the case of foreknowledge described here, i.e. the chief only knows
that the young men are brave due to his intention to dance. This would then make our
bilking challenge inconclusive. Since we can no longer arrange that the observers report
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the behaviour of the young men to the chief, we can no longer force the occurrence of
a negative correlation. If we further rule out that there are no inexplicable incidents
when the chief is unable to dance, then we are left with the original situation whereby
the chief merely observes a positive correlation between his dancing and the young men’s
bravery and the chief can thus maintain his belief in retrocausation. To arrive at this
result we have had to jettison the following condition: (iii) the chief has epistemic access
to the behaviour of the young men independently of his intention to dance. These three
conditions form a set which is shown to be inconsistent by the bilking argument.
Let us state these conditions in the more general terms we encountered at the beginning
of this section.
(i) There exists a positive correlation between an event C and an event E.
(ii) Event C is within the power of an agent to perform.
(iii) The agent has epistemic access to the occurrence of event E independently of any
intention to bring it about.
An interesting point to notice at this stage is that these conditions do not specify in which
order events C and E occur. If we consider why it is not the case that it is possible to bilk
future effects of their causes, this is because condition (iii) fails to hold for future events.
If knowledge about future events could be obtained independently of an agent’s intention
to perform certain actions, then it would be possible to bilk those future events of their
causes; this would amount, in a way, to changing the events we already know to occur in
the future. Since this sort of foreknowledge is not possible, we can consistently believe our
actions to bring about the future. Conversely, if it were the case that some past event was
known only through our intention to perform a certain action, then it would be consistent
to believe our actions to bring about the past.
The conditions under which it is possible to maintain a belief in retrocausation are
especially relevant to quantum mechanics. In fact, once we make a suitable specification
of how condition (iii) can be violated, we find that there exists a strong symmetry between
the conditions which need to hold to justify a belief in bringing about the past and what
we find to be the case in quantum mechanics. Following the prescription of Price (1996,
p.174), let us not suppose that a violation of condition (iii) entails that the relevant agent
has no epistemic access to the relevant past events independently of any intention to
bring them about, rather let us suppose that the means by which knowledge of these past
events is gathered breaks the claimed correlation between the agent’s action and those
past events. We can state our new condition as follows:
(iv) The agent can gain epistemic access to the occurrence of event E independently of
any intention to bring it about and without altering event E from what it would
have been had no epistemic access been gained.
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In the dancing chief example a violation of this condition would entail that every time
the chief attempted to discover the behaviour of the young men he subsequently affected
their behaviour to be different from what it would have been had he not attempted his
discovery. In those cases where the chief makes no attempt to discover the behaviour of
the young men, we are back to our original violation of condition (iii).
The nature of this weakened violation of condition (iii) is just the sort of condition
we would expect to hold if the system in question were a quantum system. As has
been pointed out by Price (1996, p.174), according to Dummett’s analysis of the bilking
argument, quantum mechanics has exactly the sort of dynamics we would expect of a
retrocausal physical theory. Thus we see again that the known physical structure of our
reality does not preclude a metaphysical picture that allows retrocausal influences.
4 Keeping up appearances
Hopefully it is beginning to become clear what sort of limitations constrain the form of a
metaphysical picture that allows retrocausal influences. We are now in a position to use
these constraints, along with the causal and spatiotemporal structures we have taken to
be most reasonable, to build a picture of what retrocausation actually involves. At the
centre of this discussion will be the role that we play as agents as we interact with, and
participate in, the world.
Let us start first and foremost with two conceptions of influence that are commonly
conflated when talking about the future: the view that we change events and the view
that we affect events. Consider a claim like the following: by deciding to catch the bus,
I changed my day from one in which I was late for work, to one in which I was early.
Regardless of one’s model of time, there is an inconsistency in thinking that we change
events through our actions. For an event to change, the event must have been a particular
way in the first place. If we were partial to a dynamic view of time in which the future
were unreal, it would make no sense to think of a future event as being any particular way
before it is actual; there is simply no event that is my tardiness which can be changed
before I am in fact late. However, we have explicitly signalled our intention to utilise the
block universe model of time and in such a model we can speak of future events as being
real and thus it might be possible for an event, one might say, to be a particular way ab
initio. We might say that my tardiness was an event and that this event changed into my
punctuality. But we must be careful here, because if a future event is real, it is in some
sense already out there in the four dimensional block. If we change it at some point prior
to it being a present event for us, we are left with the rather strange question: why was
it as it was before we changed it? Why did the four dimensional block contain an event
which was my tardiness, which then changed at some point into my punctuality? With
respect to the block universe view, it is not even entirely clear that this question makes
sense.
Before we get ourselves in a muddle, let us take a step back and see if we can clarify the
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above claim. We might do this by saying something like the following: when we say that
we change a future event, we mean that we change it from being something that it could
have been, say my tardiness, to something that it now actually is, say my punctuality.
Expressing what we mean by change in counterfactual terms lets us sidestep the problems
we encountered with the reality of the events under question. However, the notion we have
ended up with by doing so has a significant causal ring to it (recall our characterisation
of causation in terms of interventions); this is in fact just what we mean when we use the
word ‘affect’. I affect my day to be a day in which I am early for work, rather than a
day in which I am late. I play a particular role in bringing about the future event and
it is wrong to think that I change it from something that it already was. As long as we
commit ourselves to the block universe view in which all events in the past, present and
future are equally real, then we must think of influence in the ‘affect’ sense. Furthermore,
we can now see that this argument is as much relevant to past events as it is relevant to
future events. Under no circumstances does it make sense to change the past in any way,
since one cannot change something that is already an actual event. Retrocausality is then
not about changing the past, rather retrocausality is about affecting the past: playing a
role in bringing about a past event.
This analysis is beginning to push us into a position about determinism and the nature
of the block universe that may seem highly undesirable; namely, that we have no freedom
in choosing our own actions. If we cannot change the future in just the same way that we
cannot change the past, and if affectation is merely bringing about an event that in some
sense already exists, then it would seem that we are mere spectators of our reality in a
rather uninteresting sense. Fortunately, we are not pushed into this position by adopting
typically block universe notions as above. Moreover, coming to grips with why this is
the case will tie together many of the issues with which we have so far dealt and it will
give us our first glimpse at the metaphysical picture of reality that allows for retrocausal
influences. The solution to this seeming incompatibility between the conception of reality
as a block universe and our ability as agents to control and manipulate our surroundings
lies in thinking of causation as a perspectival notion. According to Price (2007), evidence
suggests that causation is in fact a perspectival notion; indeed, we have already been
introduced to the idea when we were considering the interventionist account of causation
above. The tentative outcome that I flagged of what we called a kind of genealogical
account of causation in terms of intervention was that a being who interacted with the
world differently to how we interact with the world as agents would have a different
concept of causation to the one that we have. Let us consider how we can use this to
help us find some sort of compatibility between the block universe view and our causal
intuitions.
The essential point to solving this problem is to realise that considering the block
universe ‘from the outside’ is availing oneself of a very different perspective of the world
to the one which we have while we are inhabiting some spatiotemporal region. The
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important difference between the two viewpoints is that there is a discrepancy between
the parts of the spacetime block that are epistemically accessible from each perspective.
The spatiotemporally constrained perspective by which we are bound permits us only
limited epistemic accessibility to other spatiotemporal regions. This is significant because
it is as spatiotemporally bound agents that we have evolved and it seems reasonable to
suggest that we are in possession of a concept of causation that reflects this very fact.
Once we imagine ourselves to be omniscient beings that have epistemic access to the
whole spatiotemporal block, as we have done in the above analysis of change and affect, it
should not come as a surprise that our causal intuitions get confused when we attempt to
consider how a spatiotemporally bound agent can deliberate about whether or not to affect
a particular event that is already determined from our imagined omniscient perspective.
The solution that I am pushing towards here is that it is because we do not know which
events are determined to occur that we can deliberate, and therefore be causal agents,
at all. The relationship between deliberation and epistemic accessibility, and the role
this plays in our concept of causation, has been explored in Price’s (2007) and it will be
important for our characterisation of retrocausality that we set out those details here.
Price (2007, p.20) sets out “an abstract characterisation of the structural, or func-
tional architecture, of deliberation” with a view to separating out the intrinsic features of
deliberation itself from those aspects of deliberation that are a function of our perspec-
tive as spatiotemporally bound agents. To begin with, a deliberator must be deliberating
over whether to bring about some particular occurrence out of a range of possible oc-
currences. Following Price, we will call the set of events of which this range consists
the options that the deliberator is considering. The set options can be thought of as
consisting of two subsets: all those occurrences over which the deliberator has immedi-
ate control, the direct options, and all those occurrences that can be brought about
indirectly via the direct options, the indirect options. All other events that are
not under consideration during the deliberation we will call the fixtures. An integral
subset of the fixtures is the set of events that the deliberator already knows, or are in
principle knowable, at the time of deliberation which we will call the knowables. The
knowables must be a subset of the fixtures since if these events are knowable to the
deliberator at the time of deliberation, then they cannot be under consideration to be
brought about and thus cannot be part of the set options. For this reason, all the events
in options must fall into the set we will call unknowables. Thus a deliberator makes
two dichotomous distinctions: the distinction between fixtures and options; and the
distinction between knowables and unknowables. The set knowables is a subset of
fixtures and the set options is a subset of unknowables. Let us now consider how
spatiotemporally bound deliberators such as ourselves might map these distinctions onto
the past and the future.
Considering the future first, we are going to want to say that much of the future belongs
to the set fixtures. This is largely due to the finite nature of deliberation: since we do
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not deliberate about bringing about the whole future all at once, there are then many
future occurrences that we take as part of the fixed background during the deliberative
process. It also seems as given that the set direct options must also be comprised of
future events. We can attribute this to the fact that we are temporally constrained agents
of a particular sort; the set direct options consists if our immediate actions and we
simply cannot deliberate about whether to bring about our past actions, only our future
actions. Further to this, we might want to say that the set indirect options also is
comprised exclusively of future events, but this would be so only if we were committed
to classifying all past events as belonging to the set fixtures. Ordinarily, this is exactly
how we consider past events: as fixed. This is for the most part a function of the fact
that we consider the past as knowable in principle, and as we have seen above, the set
knowables is a subset of the set fixtures. But is it the case that our spatiotemporally
bound perspective commits us to the past being fixed?
If such a commitment is indeed a function of the fact that we consider the past as
knowable in principle, then it would seem that the possibility of the past being unknowable
in principle would purge us of this commitment. Recall that this is exactly the condition
we found to be suitable to avoid the bilking argument in the above analysis of Dummett:
an agent is immune to having a belief in a particular retrocausal correlation bilked if the
past effect in question is epistemically inaccessible to the agent at the time of the causal
action. In the language of our current analysis, if some past event belongs to the set
unknowables then it does not necessarily belong to the set fixtures, an agent may
believe it to belong to the set indirect options. As we noted above, the very nature
of quantum mechanics ensures that it is immune to the bilking argument. Thus, in the
right circumstances, there is information about the past of some quantum systems that is
epistemically inaccessible in principle! If this is the case then it is a live possibility that the
set indirect options contains some events which are past; or rather, the architecture
of deliberation does not rule out the possibility of bringing about the past on analytic
grounds.
This schematic of where retrocausality fits in to the structure of deliberation highlights
an important feature of a metaphysical picture that allows retrocausal influences: that
agents within such a reality will always deliberate towards the future, i.e. the set direct
options will always be comprised of future events. Thus retrocausality is not deliberation
towards the past, or in other words, it is not our normally directed causation in the reverse
temporal direction.
As a final comment on the perspectival nature of causation, the way that any par-
ticular agent divides the set of all events into fixtures and options, knowable and
unknowable and past and future will depend completely upon the agents spatiotem-
poral perspective. For spatiotemporally constrained agents such as ourselves, there is a
specific recipe for how these distinctions are made which is a function of the way we have
evolved from within the spacetime block. If we imagine ourselves as omniscient beings
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who are observing the events in the spacetime block ‘from the outside’, there will be no
past or future (though there may be past and future directions along the temporal axis of
the block) and all the events will be in the set knowable and thus in the set fixtures.
This is how we can imagine the spacetime block to be entirely determined without having
this intuition be in conflict with our usual sense of free choice in the deliberative process;
these are vastly different perspectives and causality is perspectival. It is the extent of our
ignorance, of both the future and of the complete set of prior causes of our actions, that
creates the illusion, so to speak, of free choice.
5 Conclusion
This then is the package of metaphysical ideas that combine to give a picture that is
consistent with the possibility of retrocausality. We begin with two uncontroversial meta-
physical foundations in the block universe model of time and the interventionist account
of causation. We then remove two potential obstacles originating in our ordinary temporal
intuitions: we realise that we have no evidence to suggest our macroscopic asymmetric
causal intuitions can be extrapolated to the microscopic realm and we realise that we
do not necessarily have epistemic access to the past independent of our own future ac-
tions. With these obstacles gone, the emerging metaphysical picture of a temporally and
causally symmetric reality viewed from an epistemically limited vantage point concords
well with the possibility of retrocausality. A significant aspect of this assembly of ideas is
that none of the included elements are precluded by the known physical structure of our
reality. Indeed, if anything, these elements are supported by the structure of at least one
of our best physical theories: quantum mechanics.
Thus while Maudlin is clearly correct in noticing that retrocausality is fundamentally
at odds with the metaphysical picture of the past generating the future, this by no means
renders retrocausality metaphysically untenable. Given the right mix of some reasonable
metaphysical and epistemological ingredients, an alternative metaphysical picture arises
that is consistent with the possibility of retrocausality. Moreover, the conceptual cost
of these ingredients cannot be a higher price to pay than the interpretational problems
associated with the rejection of local hidden variables, simply for the fact that we were
given all these ingredients for free by the metaphysical structure of our reality and the
epistemological structure of our existence.
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